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Great Britain and the European  
Crisis. 1914.

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# GREAT BRITAIN

AND THE

## EUROPEAN CRISIS.

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CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS  
IN PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN  
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

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~~UNPUBLISHED~~ 1905



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1914.

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# INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

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## (1.)

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manœuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed.

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices.

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13—successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened.

## (2.)

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives.

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were immediately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs

that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed.

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Serbian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable.

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Serbia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French—and also of the German—Governments was that the Serbian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Serbia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Serbian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Serbia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Serbian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Serbian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Serbian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Serbian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Serbian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Serbia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August.

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Serbia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia

was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburg, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day.

### (3.)

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Serbian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Serbian Government was to publish on the front page of the "Official Journal" a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation.

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum.

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Serbian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Serbia did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake; and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Serbia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice"—by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis.

### (4.)

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum was being handed to Serbia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He

confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia.

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum; officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm.

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power—Germany not excepted—had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation.

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

## (5.)

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question before Europe—how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy; the popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of

violent popular enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Serbia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that she would have to intervene if Serbia were attacked; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war on Serbia on the 28th. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th.

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted; Russia said she was ready to stand aside; but Germany refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a settlement.

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th.

## (6.)

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Serbia and Austria; the only fear of further war had lain in the

relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal development; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburg. But now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace.

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs.

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Serbia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Serbia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace.

### (7.)

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers



with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable.

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,\* and no additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies, but to Germany we gave three times—on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August—a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows: "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe.

*Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914.*

\* See Part II.



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**NOTE.**

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(2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Cd. 7445].

(3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Cd. 7596].

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27	To Sir F. Bertie ... " Sir H. Rumbold ... " Sir G. Buchanan	1914. July 25	Has informed German Ambassador of projected Serbian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope that Germany will influence Austria-Hungary to receive it favourably ... ..	19
28	[Nil.]			
29	To Sir R. Rodd ...	25	Has informed Italian Ambassador of statements made to German Ambassador (see No. 25). His Excellency states that Italy is anxious to see war avoided	20
30	To Mr. Crackanthorpe	25	Conversation with Serbian Minister. Although ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary, Serbian Government could not agree to abandon certain political ideals ... ..	20
31	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	25	Serbian reply considered unsatisfactory. War regarded as imminent ... ..	20
32	" " ... (Telegraphic)	26	Reports conversation with German Ambassador. Latter considers that Russia will remain inactive ...	20
33	Sir H. Rumbold ... (Telegraphic)	26	Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. German Under-Secretary of State of opinion that Russia will not move unless Serbian territory is annexed ...	21
34	" " ... (Telegraphic)	26	German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government hope of His Majesty's Government that they will take favourable view of Serbian reply. German Government cannot go beyond this ... ..	21
35	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	26	Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes proposal for conference, and Italian Ambassador at Vienna will be instructed accordingly ... ..	21
36	To Sir F. Bertie ... " Sir H. Rumbold ... " Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	26	To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree to a conference in London, and to ask that French, German, and Italian representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade should urge on respective Governments that, pending decision, all active military operations should be suspended ... ..	22
37	To Sir F. Bertie ...	26	It is important to know if France will agree to suggestion that the four Powers should urge moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg ... ..	22
38	Sir R. Rodd ...	23	Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers gravity of situation lies in conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that their prestige is involved ... ..	22
39	Communicated by Serbian Minister	27	Text of Serbian reply to Austro-Hungarian note ...	22
40	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	26	Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian Government will not press for more time. Russia cannot possibly remain indifferent if Serbia is attacked ... ..	27
41	" " ... (Telegraphic)	27	Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully determined on war with Serbia ... ..	27
42	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	27	French Government accept proposals respecting conference. Necessary instructions sent to French representatives at Berlin, Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg ... ..	27
43	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	27	German Secretary of State is opposed to British proposal for a conference. In favour of direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Germany's position in the event of Russian mobilisation. Secretary of State more hopeful ... ..	28

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44	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	1914. July 27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note to Servia. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that <i>Entente</i> Powers should present solid front to Germany ... ..	28
45	" " ... (Telegraphic)	27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to propose direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg ... ..	29
46	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	27	German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey desires to keep in touch with Germany so long as the latter works for peace. Germany should urge moderation at Vienna. Servian reply might form basis for discussion ... ..	29
47	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	27	Russian Ambassador informed of British attitude. Question whether Russia would take action if Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Servian territory ... ..	29
48	To Sir M. de Bunsen	27	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who reviewed Servian question at length. Sir E. Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude towards Servian reply, which seems already to involve deep humiliation of Servia. British fleet will be kept assembled, but this is no more than proof of anxiety felt in country ... ..	30
49	To Sir R. Rodd ...	27	Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees in proposal for conference. His Excellency will recommend to German Government that Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Servia should suspend military operations pending conference ... ..	31
50	Sir M. de Bunsen ...	28	Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia ... ..	31
51	Sir F. Bertie ...	27	French Government agree to proposals of His Majesty's Government for conference between the four Powers in London ... ..	32
52	French Ambassador	27	French Government in favour of British proposal for conference, and are ready to send instructions accordingly ... ..	33
53	Communicated by Russian Ambassa- dor	28	Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Government are in favour of British proposal for conference, failing commencement of direct Austro-Russian conversations ... ..	34
54	" " ...	28	Communicates telegram received from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Government appear to have taken no measures to induce Austria-Hungary to modify attitude towards Servia, and suggesting His Majesty's Government approaching the German Government. Key of the situation really at Berlin ... ..	34
55	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his influence at Belgrade to induce Servia to give satisfaction to Austria, but Servian territorial integrity must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be respected. He has proposed direct conversations with Austria, but would be perfectly ready to stand aside if idea of conference accepted ... ..	35

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56	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	1914. July 27	Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable to localise war. Russia will restrain Servia as long as possible, in order to give time for a settlement. Russian Ambassador urged that conversations should be continued at St. Petersburg ... ..	85
57	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	27	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs' views as to conference and suspension of hostilities. Possibility of Servia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on recommendation of four Powers ... ..	86
58	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	28	Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. Grey's observations to German Ambassador will tend towards peace ... ..	86
59	" " ... (Telegraphic)	28	Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His Majesty's Government. German Ambassador has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria-Hungary would respect integrity of Servia, but gave no assurance respecting her independence ... ..	86
60	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Refers to No. 43. German Secretary of State has used similar language to French and Italian Ambassadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in thinking that German Government object only to form of proposal respecting conference. Suggests Herr von Jagow might himself be induced to suggest lines of co-operation ... ..	87
61	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austria cannot delay proceedings against Servia, and would decline any negotiations on basis of Servian reply. Nothing could now prevent conflict ... ..	87
62	" " ... (Telegraphic)	28	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who says that war will be declared to-day, and that no mediation could be accepted. Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe first and quarrel with Servia second ... ..	87
63	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	28	Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar instructions to Berlin and Vienna ... ..	88
64	" " ... (Telegraphic)	28	Inform of conversation between Servian Chargé d'Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Servia might still accept whole Austrian note if certain explanations were given her. Such explanations should be given to the Powers, who should then advise Servia to accept without conditions ... ..	88
65	Mr. Crackanthorpe... (Telegraphic)	28	Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Government pending result of efforts for peaceful solution	88
66	" " ... (Telegraphic)	28	Declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia ... ..	88
67	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	28	Refers to No. 43. Proposed conference would not be arbitration, but private and informal discussion to find a settlement. Agrees that direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna would be preferable ... ..	88
68	" " ... (Telegraphic)	28	Ready to propose that German Secretary of State should suggest method of mediation by four Powers. Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro-Russian conversations is seen ... ..	88



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69	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	1914. July 28	Refers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at prospect of direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquiries further as to proposed action at Belgrade ... ..	39
70	Communicated by Count Benckendorff	29	Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Government will announce partial mobilisation on the 29th July; that Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled; and that mediation by His Majesty's Government is most urgent. ...	39
71	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who expressed anxiety to work in concert with England. Reasons for German refusal to support proposed conference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war ... ..	40
72	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	28	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir E. Grey's language to German Ambassador (see No. 46). If Austria crossed Servian frontier Russia would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador that Germany should use her influence at Vienna ...	40
73	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Informs of Austrian declaration of war against Servia	41
74	" " ... (Telegraphic)	28	Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian Government have declined Russian Government's suggestion of direct discussion between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Russian Ambassador considers conference in London of less interested Powers the only solution ... ..	41
75	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	29	Chancellor states it is too late to act on British suggestion that Servian reply might form basis of discussion. German Government had informed Austrian Government that they quite understood that latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that demands on Servia should be carried out in their entirety. Austrian Government had been advised to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive object ... ..	41
76	" " ... (Telegraphic)	29	German Secretary of State states that any appearance of pressing moderation on Austria would probably precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by reports of military measures in Russia and France	42
77	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	29	Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of Chancellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the peace of Europe. This country will continue to make every effort in that direction ... ..	42
78	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	29	Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has communicated substance of No. 68 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria. As Austria has definitely declined direct conversations, Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to German Ambassador return to idea of conference. Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian proposals (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador says his Government are continuing to exert friendly influence at Vienna ... ..	42
79	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	29	French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps can now be taken to stop war with Servia. Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian Government gave binding engagement to Europe not to acquire Servian territory or destroy independence of Servia ... ..	43

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80	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	1911. July 29	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that German Secretary of State might propose formula, and that this might be concomitant with direct Austro-Russian conversations ... ..	44
81	To Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	29	Understands that Austria will not accept any form of mediation between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin and Vienna ... ..	44
82	Mr. Beaumont ... (Telegraphic)	29	Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably beyond the sanjak and the punitive occupation of Servian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian army from Mussulman population in Servia ... ..	44
83	Mr. Crackenthorpe... (Telegraphic)	29	Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to convey his thanks for statement in the House of Commons on the 27th July ... ..	45
84	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	29	German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endeavouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His Majesty's Government urge that Germany should suggest some method by which the four Powers could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia ... ..	45
85	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	29	German Secretary of State offers that in return for British neutrality German Government would give every assurance that they would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France. He was unable to give similar assurance as regards French colonies. If neutrality of Holland were respected by Germany's adversaries, Germany would give assurances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Belgium depend on action of France, but at end of war Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany ... ..	45
86	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	29	In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is passed for further discussions on basis of Servian note. His utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna to prevent or moderate any further Austrian demands on Servia ... ..	46
87	To Sir F. Bertie ...	29	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting policy of His Majesty's Government. Has told M. Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other hand, the present case is different from that of Morocco a few years back, and if France becomes involved His Majesty's Government, who are free from engagements, will have to decide on their attitude in the light of British interests ... ..	46
88	To Sir E. Goschen...	29	Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro-Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg impossible, it is most important, in the event of German Chancellor failing in his efforts at mediation, that Germany should propose some method of co-operation between the four Powers ... ..	47
89	" " ...	29	Has warned German Ambassador of possibility of British intervention in certain eventualities ... ..	47
90	" " ...	29	Has communicated to German Ambassador text of Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (see Nos. 64 and 81). Discussion of question of mediation ... ..	48

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91	To Sir M. de Bunsen	1914. July 29	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who attempted to justify attitude of his Government in spite of readiness of Powers to assist in obtaining satisfaction from Serbia ... ..	49
92	To Sir R. Rodd ...	29	Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Government suggest that German objections to mediation might be met by some change in procedure ...	49
93	Communicated by Count Benckendorff	30	Communicates telegraphic correspondence between himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (1) Austro-Hungarian Government have been urged by Russian Ambassador at Vienna to be moderate towards Serbia; (2) negotiations with German Government through Russian Ambassador at Berlin; (3) Austro-Hungarian Government decline direct conversations with Russian Government ...	49
94	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	29	In present temper of Austria-Hungary, irrevocable steps may be taken unless Germany with the other three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambassador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious engagement takes place before agreement is reached. Reports interviews between the Russian and French Ambassadors and the German Ambassador ... ..	52
95	" " ... (Telegraphic)	30	Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could not see Serbia crushed, but would acquiesce in measures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme anti-Servian and anti-Russian sentiments of German Ambassador to whom text of Austro-Hungarian note was probably known beforehand ... ..	52
96	" " ... (Telegraphic)	30	Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia had mobilised Austria must do likewise. No threat meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian conversations being continued at St. Petersburg. Russian Ambassador more hopeful ... ..	52
97	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	30	German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government would guarantee that Austria should respect Servian integrity. Russia could not, however, agree to vassalage of Serbia to Austria. Formula of conditions subject to which Russia would stop military preparations ... ..	53
98	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	30	German Government have asked Austrian Government whether they would accept mediation on basis of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and issue of conditions from there. Could His Majesty's Government induce Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement? German Secretary of State says that Russian mobilisation has increased difficulties of situation. German Government have made no special military preparations ... ..	53
99	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	30	Conversation with President of the Republic regarding German communication to St. Petersburg as to Russian mobilisation. Russia consents to demobilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain points in the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government. Pacific attitude of France. A British declaration to support France would prevent Germany going to war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration ...	54

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100	Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic)	1914 July 30	German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany could prevent Austria from making exorbitant demands if Serbia would submit on occupation of Belgrade . .	54
101	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	30	Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot entertain German proposals to secure British neutrality. For many reasons such a bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government must preserve full freedom of action. Best way of maintaining good relations with Great Britain is for Germany to work with her for the preservation of peace ... ..	55
102	" " ... (Telegraphic)	30	Has warned German Ambassador that Germany must not count on Great Britain standing aside in all circumstances ... ..	55
103	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	30	German Ambassador states that German Government would advise Austria not to advance beyond Belgrade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged Serbia to give satisfaction sufficient to placate Austria. Earnest hope that this may be agreed to. Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 97) in order to meet existing situation . . . . .	55
104	To Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	30	To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (see No. 103). Trusts that French Ambassador at St. Petersburg will be able to induce Russian Government not to precipitate a crisis . . . . .	56
105	" " ...	30	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting attitude of Great Britain in event of conflict between France and Germany; encloses copies of notes exchanged with French Ambassador in 1912, and discusses their scope. Cabinet to meet to-morrow ...	56
106	Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic)	30	Austria has declined to continue direct conversations with Russia. Germany believed to be more disposed to give conciliatory advice at Vienna owing to likelihood of British support for Russia and France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in favour of working with His Majesty's Government even if idea of discussions between four Powers is impossible ... ..	58
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108	" " ... (Telegraphic)	31	German Chancellor states that owing to Russian mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These proceedings had come just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor and when the latter was about to mediate at Vienna ... ..	59
109	" " ... (Telegraphic)	31	Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His Majesty's Government to his appeal for British neutrality (see No. 101). Chancellor desires time to reflect on it ... ..	60
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128	Sir F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic)	1	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium expects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power ... ..	67
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136	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	1	General mobilisation in France ordered owing to German military measures. French troops have left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier ...	70
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138	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with German Secretary of State. German Government have ordered mobilisation. Absence of reply to German ultimatum must be regarded as creating a state of war. Russian Government will be so informed ... ..	71
139	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	1	Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Austrian domination of Serbia would vitally affect Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Government and German preparations have forced Russian Government to order mobilisation, and mobilisation of Germany has created desperate situation. M. Sazonof would adhere to formula contained in No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration in the Balkans ... ..	71
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## GREAT BRITAIN.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Sir Edward Grey.
<i>Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Sir A. Nicolson.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Paul Cambon.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Benckendorff.
		Monsieur de Etter ( <i>Counsellor of Embassy</i> ).
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Prince Lichnowsky.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Mensdorff.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	...	Count Lalaing
<i>Serbian Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Boschkovitch.

## FRANCE.

<i>President of the Republic</i>	...	Monsieur Poincaré.
<i>President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Viviani.
<i>Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Bienvenu-Martin.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Francis Bertie.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Isvolsky.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Baron von Schoen.
<i>Austrian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Scézsén.

## RUSSIA.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Sazonof.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir George Buchanan.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Paléologue.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Count Pourtalès.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Szápáry.

## GERMANY.

<i>Imperial Chancellor</i>	...	Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
<i>Secretary of State</i>	...	Herr von Jagow.
<i>Under Secretary of State</i>	...	Herr von Zimmermann.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Edward Goschen.
		Sir Horace Rumbold ( <i>Counsellor of Embassy</i> ).
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Swerbeiev.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Jules Cambon.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Szogyény.

## AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Count Berchtold.
<i>Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Baron Macchio.
	...	Count Forgach
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Dumaine.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Schebeko.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Herr von Tschirsky.

## ITALY.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Marquis di San Giuliano.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Rennell Rodd.

## BELGIUM.

<i>British Minister</i>	...	Sir Francis Villiers.
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## SERVIA.

<i>Prime Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Pashitch.
<i>British Minister</i>	...	Mr. des Graz.
		Mr. Crackanthorpe ( <i>First Secretary</i> ).
<i>Austro-Hungarian Minister</i>	...	Baron Giesl.

# PART I.

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## CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT.

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No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.*

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Serbia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,\* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Serbia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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No. 2.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 22, 1914.*

LAST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Serbia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

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## No. 3.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.*

COUNT MENSENDORFF<sup>a</sup> told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

<sup>a</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 4.

*Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London — (Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie :

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante :—

"La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage."

"Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terroisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse-

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade :

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government :—

"Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter."

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of

ments subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

"Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

"Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la 'Narodna Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

"Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

"C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

"Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du 'Journal officiel' en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante:—

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore

outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the

sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

“Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

“Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.”

“Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le ‘Bulletin officiel’ de l'armée.

“Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre :

“1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale ;

“2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite ‘Narodna Odbrana,’ à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ;

“3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomentier la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ;

“4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal ;

fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

“The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

“The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.”

“This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the ‘Official Bulletin’ of the Army.

“The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

“1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

“2. To dissolve immediately the society styled ‘Narodna Odbrana,’ to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ;

“3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

“4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government ;

"5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie ;

"6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe ;

"des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives ;

"7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voïja Tankosić et du nommé Milan Ciganović, employé de l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo ;

"8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière ;

"à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière ;

"9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; enfin

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

"Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

"Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note."

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ;

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory ; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto ;

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voïja Tankosić and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo ;

"8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ;

"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government ; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations :—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the



subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'État et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et officieux du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le

Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomats, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government

royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régime devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier elucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

*Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.*

#### ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavril Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative—crime com-

hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues, and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

#### ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Sarajevo against Gavril Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination com-

mis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, de l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavriilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, le nommé Milan Čiganović et Trifko Grabež, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosić.

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganović et le commandant Voija Tankosić.

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

4°. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganović enseigna à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

5°. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganović.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Čabać (Rade Popović) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbić de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

mitted by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Sarajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavriilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms dépôt of the Servian Army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Čabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

#### No. 5.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*  
(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*  
NOTE addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.\*

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time-limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff\* replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part.

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

## No. 6.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof\* to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof\* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

No. 7.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

BEFORE departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

No. 8.

*Mr. Crackanhorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9.

*Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.*

THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts

that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

#### No. 10.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

AFTER telling M. Cambon\* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept

\* French Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

#### No. 11.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky\* said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

\* German Ambassador in London.

#### No. 12.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

SERBIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Serbian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at

Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

### No. 13.

*Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.*

(Translation.)

M. SAZONOF télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914 :

"La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

"Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie, se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se con vainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

"Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases même des relations internationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne."

M. Sazonof espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ad-

M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914 :

"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna."

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to



herera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes.

the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.

## No. 14.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburg), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

## No. 15.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.\* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.†

\* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

## No. 16.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

## No. 17.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,\* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversa-

\* See No. 14

† See No. 12.

tion which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

#### No. 18.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin. July 25, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of the 24th July\* acted on.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold† is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He

\* See No. 11.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs

said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

## No. 19.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

## No. 20.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

LANGUAGE of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

## No. 21.

*Mr. Crakanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to*  
*Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

THE Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:—

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrena.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

## No. 22.

*Mr. Crakanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to*  
*Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in

view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

## No. 23.

*Mr. Cruckanhorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

THE Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina\* will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

\* The Ser ian Parliament.

## No. 24.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at  
St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,\* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

\* See No. 6.

## No. 25.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France,† Russia, and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky\* said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation

\* German Ambassador in London.

† Should be "Italy."

between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

No. 26.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"The delay given to Serbia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Serbia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irrevocable steps.

No. 27.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir P. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.\* I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

\* See No. 21.

No. 28.

[Nil.]

## No. 29.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

## No. 30.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson\* on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch† his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

† Servian Minister in London.

## No. 31.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

SERVIAN reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

## No. 32.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

ACCORDING to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister

for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

## No. 33.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

EMPEROR returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

## No. 34.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.\*

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

\* See No. 21.

## No. 35.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

## No. 36.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

## No. 37.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

BERLIN telegram of 25th July.\*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

\* See No. 18.

## No. 38.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 27.)*

Sir,

*Rome, July 23, 1914.*

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusionments which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

## No. 39.

*Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.—(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)*

(Translation.)

LE GOUVERNEMENT Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du \*10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gâter les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

THE Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,\* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'Etat, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le \*18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renou-

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina† and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th\* March, 1909—have not been renewed

\* Old style.

† The Servian Parliament.



visées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédés que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante:

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie

on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Serbia

condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers ou fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909,\* qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la révision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société

condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909,\* which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal Army as an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness Prince Alexander, and shall be published in the next official bulletin of the Army.

The Royal Government further undertake :—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupchtina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna

\* New style.

† The Servian Parliament.

"Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomentier la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15<sup>e</sup> juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction

Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15<sup>th</sup>\* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications

en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongrois et qui jusqu'au 15\* juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une en-

as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th\* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by refer-

tente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

*Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914.*

ring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

*Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.*

No. 40.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant\* (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

\* See No. 26.

† See No. 36.

No. 41.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,\* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

\* Nos. 36 and 37

## No. 43.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 26th July.\*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonoff to exchange views with Count Berchtold.† He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

\* See No. 36.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 44.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.\* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict.

\* See No. 6.

In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

No. 45.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,\* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

\* See No. 44.

No. 46.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

No. 47.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.\*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will

\* See No. 46.

take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

## No. 48.

*Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.  
COUNT MENSENDORFF\* told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Serbia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Serbia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Serbia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Serbia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension,

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.



and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 49.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson\* to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano† would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

† Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 50.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 31.)*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Serbia.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 50.

*Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

(Translation.)

POUR mettre fin aux menées subversives partant de Belgrade et dirigées contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a fait parvenir à la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie une note dans laquelle se trouvait formulée une série de demandes pour l'acceptation desquelles un délai de quarante-huit heures a été accordé au Gouvernement Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu à cette note d'une manière satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche - Hongrie, qui vient

IN order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just ad-

d'adresser à la Serbie une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, se considère dès lors en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de déclarer que l'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au cours des hostilités, sous la réserve d'un procédé analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'à celles de la Déclaration de Londres du 26 février, 1909.

L'Ambassade est priée de vouloir bien communiquer, d'urgence, la présente notification à son Gouvernement.

dressed to Servia a formal declaration, in conformity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

#### No. 51.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.--*  
(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Paris, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

#### Enclosure in No. 51.

*Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.*

(Translation.)

PAR une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après Sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Petersbourg des représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon\* à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la démarche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République

IN a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon\* to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire ex-

\* French Ambassador in Berlin.

a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorisé M. Paul Cambon\* à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienne [sic]. Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, &c.

Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914.

pressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon\* to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consultation with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council *ad interim* takes the opportunity, &c.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

\* French Ambassador in London.

## No. 52.

*Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon\* à prendre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre, qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

M. Viviani† est prêt à envoyer aux représentants français à Vienne, Saint-

THE Government of the Republic accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon\* to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani† is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna,

\* French Ambassador in London.

† French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement britannique.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 27 juillet, 1914.*

St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

*French Embassy, July 27, 1914.*

No. 53.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)*

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
le 14 (27) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

L'AMBAassadeUR d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une révision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse donnée par le Ministre de la Justice français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,  
July 27, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

THE British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)*

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

MES entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,  
July 15 (28), 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

MY interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,\* I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

\* See No. 44.

No. 56.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to

the guarantees which Serbia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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No. 57.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 27, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

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No. 58.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram\* to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

\* See No. 46.

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No. 59.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday\* to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

\* See No. 47.

No. 60.

*Sir R. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday\* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

\* See No. 43.

No. 61.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July\* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,† which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary: that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.

\* See No. 46.

† "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

## No. 63.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.\*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

\* See No. 27.

## No. 64.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:—

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

## No. 65.

*Mr. Crakanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to*  
*Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

## No. 66.

*Mr. Crakanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to*  
*Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria.

## No. 67.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July\* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration,

\* See No. 43.



but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.\*

\* See No. 46.

No. 68.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.\*

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

\* See No. 55.

No. 70.

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914.*

(1.) *Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.*

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2.) *Telegram to Count Benckendorff.\**

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.

\* Russian Ambassador in London.

## No. 71.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Arcopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept the proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

## No. 72.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram\* to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

\* See No. 45.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

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## No. 73.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July\* in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

\* See No. 4.

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## No. 74.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

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## No. 75.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at

Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

No. 77.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram to to-day.\* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

\* See No. 75.

No. 78.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—* (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant\* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's,

\* See No. 67.

to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,\* which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Serbia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Serbia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant† was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Serbia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

\* See No. 57.

† See No. 69.

#### No. 79.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

## No. 80.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

IN your telegram of the 27th instant\* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

\* See No. 46.

† See No. 43.

## No. 81.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.\*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

\* See No. 64.

## No. 82.

*Mr. Beaumont, British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey.—* (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

## No. 83.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 29, 1914.*

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

## No. 84.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Serbia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

## No. 85.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise.

It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day\* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

\* See No. 77.

No. 86.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

AFTER telling M. Cambon\* to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon\* that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky† not

\* French Ambassador in London.

† German Ambassador in London.



to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

No. 88.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Sir,

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,\* that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

\* Russian Ambassador in London.

No. 89.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Sir,

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our

conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

No. 90.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July\* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's† telegram of the 28th July‡ and of my reply to it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano¶ had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

\* See No. 84.

† British Ambassador in Rome.

‡ See No. 64.

§ See No. 81.

¶ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 91.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*  
THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff\* said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff\* deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

## No. 92.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*  
THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano\* suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

\* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 93.

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914.*

(1.)

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof.\**

*Vienne, (Translation.)*

*le 15 (28) juillet, 1914. (Telegraphic.)*

*(Télégraphique.)*

J'AI entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold† dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis

*Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.*

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold† to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice,

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold\* sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold\* me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold\* ajouta que la crise était devenue si aigue, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Serbia.

I drew Count Berchtold's\* attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Count Berchtold\* replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold\* added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Serbian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Serbia's promises for the future.

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(2.)

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.*

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

*St. Petersburg,  
July 16 (29), 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

(Telegraphic.)

THE German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Serbian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation

ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

### (3.)

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.*

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.\*

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

*St. Petersburg,  
July 16 (29), 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's\* telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

\* Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

## No. 94.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

## No. 95.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

## No. 96.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his

interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

## No. 97.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof\* told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof\* to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof\* accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:—

"If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 98.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's\* telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of

\* German Ambassador in London.

aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram\* received from Prince Lichnowsky† last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done.

\* See No. 102.

† German Ambassador in London.

No. 99.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 30, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

No. 100.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.



## No. 101.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 29th July.\*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

\* See No. 85.

## No. 102.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky\* that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky\* to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.†

\* German Ambassador in London.

† See No. 98.

## No. 103.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured

to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,\* as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,† and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† See No. 97.

No. 104.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan\* of to-day,† and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

\* British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

† See No. 103.

No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

M. CAMBON\* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

\* French Ambassador in London.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

My dear Ambassador,

*Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood

that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,  
E. GREY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

*M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*L'Ambassade de France,  
Londres,*

*cc 23 novembre, 1912.*

(Translation.)  
*French Embassy, London,  
November 23, 1912.*

Cher Sir Edward,

PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les

Dear Sir Edward,

YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would de-

deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

PAUL CAMBON.

liberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105.

*French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

(Translation.)

L'ARMÉE allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16<sup>e</sup> Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie du 8<sup>e</sup> venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15<sup>e</sup> Corps d'Armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation: or, nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi,\* le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

THE German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday,\* the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

\* Sic in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended.

No. 106.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I LEARNED from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct

exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Serbia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

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No. 107.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

(Received July 31)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication\* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

\* See No. 84.

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No. 108.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

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## No. 109.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.\* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

\* See No. 101.

## No. 110.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.

## No. 111.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

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## No. 112.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr"\* will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr"\* signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

\* "Imminence of War."

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## No. 113.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and that she cannot afford to let her get a start.

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## No. 114.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and*  
*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

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No. 115.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.\*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

\* See No. 99.

No. 117.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.



## No. 118.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Serbia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Serbia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Serbia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

## No. 119.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

M. CAMBON\* referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson† this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask

\* French Ambassador in London.

† British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

### No. 120.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July\* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:—

“Si l’Autriche consentira à arrêter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d’Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d’État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s’engage à conserver son attitude expectante.”‡

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

M. Sazonoff§ said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

\* See No. 103.

† See No. 97.

‡ TRANSLATION.—“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.”

§ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 121.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*

*(Received August 1.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 31st July.\*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.

\* See No. 111.

## No. 122.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*

*(Received August 1)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.\*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

\* See No. 114.

## No. 123.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply\* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very

\* See No. 122.

allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant que les mesures militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

No. 130.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what ground the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

No. 132.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof\* to Count Benckendorff† of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:—

“(Urgent.)

“Formule amendée conformément à la proposition anglaise: ‘Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Russian Ambassador in London.

atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.'""\*

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

\* TRANSLATION.—“Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: ‘If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.’”

### No. 133.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

M. DE ETTER\* came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof,† dated the 31st July, which are as follows:—

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

\* Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

### No. 134.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*

*(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

### No. 135.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of

this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government.

No. 136.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

MINISTER of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand,"\* the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

\* "State of war."

No. 137.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Serbia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff\* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold,† and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff\* to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 138.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

YOUR telegram of to-day.\*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war.

\* See No. 131.

## No. 139.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

MY telegram of 31st July.\*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonoff had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Serbian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonoff informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally.

\* See No. 120.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonoff was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonoff added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,\* had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

\* See No. 120.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

#### No. 140.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act

#### No. 141.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the



first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

## No. 142.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

## No. 143.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August\* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

\* See No. 130.

## No. 144.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

## No. 145.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

MY telegram of 1st August.\*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

\* See No. 143.

## No. 146.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

## No. 147.

*Minister of State, Luxembourg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(Translation.)

*Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants :

Dimanche, 2 août, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraire à la neutralité du Grand Duché garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères à Berlin.

*Luxembourg,*

(Telegraphic.) *August 2, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts :—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxembourg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxembourg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxembourg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxembourg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxembourg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

## No. 148.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon\* the following memorandum :—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon\* asked me about the violation of Luxembourg. I told him the

\* French Ambassador in London.

doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

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No. 149.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 1st August.\*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship "Sappho" at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,† I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

\* See No. 143.

† See No. 130.

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No. 150.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 2nd August\*: Detention of British ships at Hamburg.  
No information available.

\* See No. 149.

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No. 151.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been sent to-day:—

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

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No. 152.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:—

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano\* replied:—

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral."

In making this communication, M. Cambon† was instructed to lay stress

\* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† French Ambassador in London.

upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

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No. 153.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:—

“Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

His Majesty’s Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty’s Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

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No. 154.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*

(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

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No. 155.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

YOU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty’s Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty’s Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty’s Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

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No. 156.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This

action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

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## No. 157.

*German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lielnowsky, German Ambassador in London,—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

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## No. 158.

*Sir P. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

MILITARY attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

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## No. 159.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning\* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

\* See No. 153.

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## No. 160.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

*London, August 8, 1914.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant\* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government

\* See No. 153.

would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow\* at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,† and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow\* expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow\* wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to

\* German Secretary of State.

† See No. 159.

advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.\*

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow† a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann‡ said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann‡ left me, a flying sheet, issued by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow† at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow† came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly

\* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

† German Secretary of State.

‡ German Under-Secretary of State.

not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt,'" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:—

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow\* and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by

\* German Secretary of State.



my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,\* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I leave, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

\* American Ambassador in Berlin.

# No. 161.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

London, September 1, 1914.

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serbia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirscky,\* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold† during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia. The official "Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl‡ had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the

\* German Ambassador at Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's\* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.† On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons‡ on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

‡ See Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933.

throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Serbia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirsky\* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary† with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof‡. Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko|| again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko|| that Count Szapary† had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof‡ that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof‡, M. Schebeko|| added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,¶ to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.\*\* M. Schebeko|| to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold,§ and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,†† had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko|| repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko|| had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold§ informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko|| left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that

\* German Ambassador in Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

‡ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

§ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

|| Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

¶ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

\*\* See No. 137.

†† Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold\* the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The "Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgium neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff,† at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold\* received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff† had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of *Chargé des Archives*. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.



## PART II.

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### SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

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## PART II.

### SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

#### (1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914.

LAST week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There has been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple *Entente*, for some years past. The Triple *Entente* was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic

support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Governments:—

"My dear Ambassador,

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for

instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

*Lord Charles Beresford.*—What is the date of that?

*Sir E. Grey.*—The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western

coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether the countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in those compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal

way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that—confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, used these words. He said:—

“We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that we could not think this country was bound either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty’s Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country’s honour or to the country’s interests.”

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:—

“There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever.”

The treaty is an old treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone’s Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:—

“The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power

violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was:—

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:—

"Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George:—

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," volume 203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:—

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under

the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it to intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which

the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.



(2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914.

GERMANY AND BELGIUM.

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect:—

"Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means."

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which it has received. I make no further comment upon it.

(3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914.

*Mr. Bonar Law.*—I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement that he can now make to the House?

*The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).*—In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect:—

"The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply."

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:—

"German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces."

Simultaneously—almost immediately afterwards—we received from the Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram:—

"General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-Chapelle)."

Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory. We also received this morning from the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms:—

"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most posi-

tively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expence of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning—which I have read to the House—should be given before midnight.

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(4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914.

*Mr. Bonar Law.*—May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can give us to-day?

*The Prime Minister.*—Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves.

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:—

"I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs":

—that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs—

"a note of which the following is a literal translation:—

"Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Government that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty.

"Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power.

"Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory.

"There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defence of her fortified places.'"

We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador here the following telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels:—

"The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French military attaché to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers now being made. Orders have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier."

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of 100,000,000l.

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(5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 6, 1914.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the

country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war."

*The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).*—In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated—and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how unrelenting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of hon. Members show something more than that. They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper.\* I think I must refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on:—

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government"—

Let the House observe these words—

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue."

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:—

"I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies"—

What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe—

"and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect."

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial, and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:—

"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise."

Then we come to Belgium:—

"It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

\* See Part I, No. 85, page 45.

Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality; but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added:—

“Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances”——

the assurances I have read out to the House—

“might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired.”

What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our pledged word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This document, No. 101 of my Paper,\* puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says:—

“His Majesty’s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view”——

My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language:—

“such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.”

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded:—

“Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.”

He then says:—

“We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require.”

And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate:—

“You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that

\* See Part I, No. 101, page 53.

they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will.

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it"—

**The statement was never more true—**

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if—in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war—we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of 100,000,000. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supple-

mentary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications—whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise—for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact, a great disaster—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case, in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family.

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in my general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.











